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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Counter-Hegemonic Narratives and the Politics 
of Plurality: Problematising Global Environmental 
Governance from Latin America through the 
Case of Bolivia
Michela Coletta* and Malayna Raftopoulos†
This article seeks to problematise current frameworks of global environmental governance by  examining 
how the neoliberal model continues to rely on the state to suppress plurinational justice. Firstly, it 
 discusses the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses through the emergence of new centres of 
 epistemic  production. Secondly, it analyses the ways in which these narratives interact, or fail to  interact, 
with state policies on a local, national and international level through the case study of Evo Morales’ 
Bolivia. The article argues that one of main challenges confronting environmental governance will be 
to  reformulate sovereignty as an epistemic and relational – as well as political and territorial – set of 
 relationships.
Keywords: Bolivia; Decoloniality; Environment; Governance; Hegemony; Sovereignty
A central question in the evolving theories and practices 
of global governance is how to articulate sovereignty. The 
expanding networks of actors involved in decision-making 
processes affecting communities across and beyond the 
political and legal boundaries of the nation-state require 
increased international cooperation ( Bhagwati 2004). 
Understandings of the present and future of global gov-
ernance are increasingly fluid, so much so that some 
argue that a definition of global governance comes down 
to developing new tools to adapt to swiftly changing 
power relations (Held and Hale 2011). The interactions 
and alliances between private and public governance 
is at the core of current practices. Informed by the free 
market principle, the logic of global capitalism apparent 
in carbon offset programmes like REDD++ has led to an 
era of ‘free market environmentalism’ (Lohmann 2010). 
Similarly, while most Latin American countries recognise 
indigenous peoples’ territorial rights, notably through the 
adoption of international mechanisms such as the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
and the International Labour Organisation Convention 
No. 169 (ILO 169), in practice these are often made null 
by state contracts with private investors for land use and 
resource extraction.
Global environmental governance is broadly defined 
as ‘the process of formulating and contesting images and 
designs, and implementing procedures and practices that 
shape the access, control and use of natural resources 
among different actors’ (de Castro et al. 2016: 6). However, 
as this paper will demonstrate, the role of the state needs 
to be reassessed in light of a wider and deeper formulation 
of sovereignty and of what this might mean for the future 
of global governance. While ‘global governance is arguably 
inevitable for the survival of the human race in present and 
future generations’ (Jang et al. 2016: 3), the proliferation 
of potentially conflicting international and intranational 
actors vis-à-vis the system of sovereign states raises the 
issue of a reproduction of globalised capitalism in which 
the nation-state insures the juridical space for transac-
tional activities on a global scale. Purdy considers the domi-
nant form of global environmental politics to be a dystopic 
scenario that he calls ‘the neoliberal Anthropocene’, which 
‘ simply envisions ever-intensified management of the 
globe, carried forward by market means, beginning from 
our vast present inequality’ (2015: 48). Latin American 
environmental governance practices, which over the last 
decade have been set within the global North-South frame-
work, offer rich insights into the contradictions, as well as 
the possibilities, that are emerging in several countries in 
the region from the heterogeneous character of multiple 
intrastate claims to sovereignty challenging the current 
state-business alliance model of global governance.
Firstly, this paper seeks to reappraise notions of global 
South from the longer-term perspective of universalising 
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narratives by offering a critical discussion of Latin American 
critiques of hegemonic discourses since the late  twentieth 
century. The first section shows how Latin American 
 cultural critics appropriated the notion of ‘hegemony’ in 
the 1980s in order to articulate their  countries’ hybrid and 
heterogenous forms of socialisation, which the homoge-
nising model of the liberal nation-state was insufficient to 
account for. Furthermore, it explains how the notions of 
hybridity and heterogeneity were used in the 1980s and 
1990s to deconstruct monolithic narratives of modernity 
that did not fit Latin American  socio-cultural realities. At 
the turn of the century, this critical apparatus converged 
into an intellectual movement that has produced original 
alternative categories for approaching global developmen-
talist theories. In this respect, the paper will address the 
extent to which the current patterns of global  governance 
can be considered as a reproduction of the classic centre-
periphery framework (Wallerstein 1974). The second sec-
tion analyses the emergence in the twenty-first century of 
an environmental turn in the Latin American decolonial 
movement through the formulation of notions of rela-
tionality and pluriversality, which disrupt the theoretical 
foundations of national sovereignty.
Over the last ten years or so, some Latin American coun-
tries have applied the principle of plurality in their con-
stitutional systems by including both human and natural 
subjects (Lalander 2016). In the final section, the case 
study of Evo Morales’ decolonial project in Bolivia since 
2007 will be analysed in order to show the conflicting 
stances that are at play in the relation between private, 
state and intrastate actors within the current pattern of 
global sovereignty, whereby the homogenising discourse 
of the nation-state continues to be instrumental to inter-
national private capital (Alvik 2011; Wallerstein 2004). 
This analysis will be primarily based on media reports 
and official reports between 2006 and 2018. Overall, the 
article problematises current frameworks of global envi-
ronmental governance by bringing to light some of the 
ways in which the neoliberal model continues to rely on 
the state to suppress plurinational justice and argues that, 
as Latin American decolonial movements show, a future 
challenge will be to reformulate sovereignty as an epis-
temic and relational – as well as political and territorial 
– set of relationships.
Deconstructing Hegemonic Narratives in Latin 
America
Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the world 
order was no longer divided along the lines of First, Second 
and Third World but was instead split between the “global 
South” and the “global North”. Although geographically 
ubiquitous, the term combines the North-South polari-
sation with an increasingly integrated market economy. 
According to some critics, the global South should be 
considered from the perspective of continued western 
imperialism. The implicit suggestion that this new geo-
political assemblage intersects the traditional boundaries 
of earlier world-system divisions by creating a criss-cross 
of networks on a global scale, may mask the historic 
dichotomic set of relations of western and non-western, 
center and periphery, and developed and underdeveloped 
(or developing) worlds, for which the colonisation of the 
 Americas was essential (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992). 
For  Levander and Mignolo, the global South incorporates 
not only the tensions between First World and Third 
World, but also between east and west (2011: 4). At the 
same time, for the people living in the global South, the 
latter also denotes places where ‘decolonial emancipa-
tions are taking place and where new horizons of life are 
emerging’ (ibid. 5).
In the case of Latin America, the North-South polarity 
can be said to preserve and reiterate, in terms that are 
historically and ethnically more neutral, the nineteenth-
century divergence between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin 
blocks. This preceded the notion of the west, designating 
a civilisational disparity that created symbolic conver-
gences between Latin America and Europe – especially 
with France and Southern Europe –, while offering an 
anti-US platform (Coletta 2018; Mignolo 2008). The idea 
of ‘Latin’ America served the purpose for international 
powers to create a Latin block that could counterbalance 
the Anglo-Saxon compound (Degiovanni 2008). Over the 
last four decades, much of Latin American historiography 
on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has revealed 
the persistent role of cultural and civilisational constructs 
to understand the continuity of colonial structures. The 
notion of ‘informal empire’ describes Latin America’s 
relations with European powers – especially France, 
Spain and Great Britain in the nineteenth and early 
 twentieth  centuries and with the USA during the rest of 
the  twentieth century –, through new forms of imperial-
ism that did not involve territorial annexation and direct 
political control. This kind of informal interventionism is 
primarily exercised in the broad sphere of ‘culture’ (Brown 
2008; Salvatore 2006).
Symbolic supranational constructs have been instru-
mental in allowing national elites to push through the 
liberal political and economic agenda. The imaginary 
afforded by the universalist principle of modernity was 
crucial to the creole elites of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to gain access to the cosmopolitan 
transnational community of the so-called civilised world 
(Coletta 2018). Escobar argues that ‘Latin America has been 
haunted by the ghost of modernity for centuries’ (2014: 
61). Considered as a hegemonic narrative, modernity can 
be said to have helped to frame the region’s submission 
to the nineteenth-century principle of progress first, and 
to the twentieth-century model of development later, in 
spite of the fact that the Latin American socio-political 
reality has been far removed from these modernising and 
democratising ideals. In fact, ‘[Latin America’s] histori-
cal-structural dependence [on] the Global Coloniality of 
Power […] [was not] eradicated or altered sufficiently to 
give place to a democratic production and management of 
the state’ (Quijano 2012: 17). The 1970s theory of depend-
ency was based on the premise that ‘underdevelopment 
is not a phase that precedes development, but rather its 
consequence’, critiquing the fact that ‘conventional devel-
opment economics did not adequately take into account 
historical situations or power relations’ (Lang and Mokrani 
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2013: 17). The blanket principle of a global agency allows 
the global elites to produce profitable alliances between 
state and capital. It has been argued that the critical value 
that the idea of a ‘global South’ initially had for scholars 
and social analysts has virtually been lost in its institution-
alised usage (Schwarz 2015).
The hegemonic value of modernity, of which globalism 
can be considered its most recent version, is given by a 
strong correlation between the cultural, the political and 
the economic spheres. The creation of a material and sym-
bolic world system, which Wallerstein (1974) characterised 
as one based on a centre-periphery logic, is mirrored by the 
process of internalising identities emanating from a cen-
tral locus of knowledge, which cultural scholars of Latin 
America have defined as ‘peripheral modernity’ (Sarlo 
1988). This sense of deficiency in fulfilling the modernist 
ideal has produced a rich historiography on the failures of 
the Latin American nation as a cultural and political pro-
ject. Most Latin American critics who have engaged with 
post-colonial forms of imperialism by delving into the 
specific traits of Latin American modernity have critiqued 
the notion of culture as instrumental to the expansion of 
Euro-modernity. In this context, it is little surprise that 
Gramsci’s (1891–1937) notion of ‘hegemony’, understood 
as the consolidation of socio-economic relations of power 
through the symbolic sphere, became popular in Latin 
America before anywhere else (Modonesi 2013: 261). The 
emphasis that Gramsci placed on the extent to which 
power relations were exercised through cultural norma-
tivity was productive for Latin American intellectuals to 
account for the co-existence of, and mutual contamina-
tion between, modern and non-modern structures.
In the 1980s, Latin American cultural studies schol-
ars used the Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony in 
their analysis of hegemonic-subaltern relations. García 
Canclini argued that the category of hegemony was much 
more appropriate than that of domination in describing 
the ‘political and ideological direction’ of those in power 
through ‘alliances with the other classes’ (1984: 73–74). 
Everyday life practices such as consumption were seen 
as a space of interaction through symbolic and material 
exchange, as well as of protest and subversion. New forms 
of consumption and communication meant that the rela-
tionship between different social groups was fluid in a 
way that was unprecedented. The notion of hegemony 
was  useful due to its diffuseness, in that it made room for 
forms of cross-fertilisation between the hegemonic and 
the subaltern. These were essential to explain not only the 
coexistence in Latin America of capitalist and pre- capitalist 
forms of social, political and economic  interaction, but also 
the insurgence of new interconnected forms of  protest 
through ‘multiple irruptions’ (García Canclini 1984: 75) 
that do not fit in with the homogenising  top-down logic 
of the nation-state.
Developing this framework into the theory of ‘hybrid-
ity’, García Canclini (1990) claimed that because of the 
multiplicity of the continent’s histories and traditions, 
Latin America epitomises the impure character of the 
modern nation-state, and the fundamental inconsist-
ency and failure of liberal democracies. The principle of 
democratic representation that the liberal Latin American 
nations adopted when they established their constitu-
tions is reflected, for Canclini, in the same processes 
through which national institutions modernise culture by 
incorporating tradition into an abstract sphere which is 
insufficient to account for the multiplicity, plurality and 
complexity of social realities. Hence the crisis of moder-
nity – and of the modern nation-state as the sole entity 
with a legitimate claim to sovereignty. This crisis of demo-
cratic nations corresponds to the crisis of the modern pro-
ject as a whole in so far as they are both based on the 
principles of individual freedom and abstract rationality.
Modernity’s attempt to level out conflictivity within 
the boundaries of the nation was further challenged in 
the mid 1990s by Cornejo Polar (2013), for whom several 
conflicts were at play between western and non-western 
 elements of postcolonial nations where the western canon 
is disrupted from within. The category of hybridity did 
not fully challenge instances of syncretism: new articula-
tions are necessary ‘to explain sociocultural situations and 
discourses in which the dynamics of the multiple inter-
crossings do not operate in a syncretic way, but instead 
emphasise conflicts and alterities’ (Cornejo Polar 2004: 
117). The notion of tradition as functional to a hegemonic 
modernity was replaced by Cornejo Polar by the notion 
of the heterogenous. One example of this ‘heterogeneity’ 
is the culture of orality, which interferes and throws into 
confusion the monolithic construct of the modern sub-
ject. Both the disruption of the homogenising principle 
of the nation-state and a notion of the subject not just 
as plural but also as relational, make these interpretative 
frameworks relevant and illuminating in the context of 
more recent Latin American decolonial critiques.
Rearticulating the Global as Plural in Latin 
American Decoloniality
Latin American critical thinking in recent decades 
has increasingly been focused on the ways in which 
the paradigm of modernity has ‘othered’ nature. The 
schism between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ is reflected in the 
 schizophrenic distinction between what Purdy calls ‘the 
Bankers’ nature’ and ‘the Backpackers’ Nature’ (2015: 
239). Is the dichotomic structure of the human-world 
distinction still possible in the Anthropogenic era? Can, 
for example, future advancements in human technology, 
such as geo-engineering, be enough to prepare the planet 
for the tremendous challenge represented by growing and 
richer human societies? It is widely recognised that the 
Anthropogenic epoch – whether it is considered to be a 
result of capitalist modes of production and consumption 
or as having started with the beginnings of agriculture 
5,000 years ago – requires unprecedented efforts. Since 
at least the mid twentieth century, Latin Americans have 
engaged with the performative value of the universalis-
ing model of modernity by questioning the relevance of 
a single centre of knowledge for their countries’ social, 
ethnic and cultural realities. Gramsci’s notion of cultural 
 narratives as instrumental for controlling power relations 
continues to be greatly relevant to Latin American deco-
lonial critics, who are shifting the monolithic  rhetoric 
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of multi-cultural global modernity towards a politics of 
plurality ingrained in unique processes of knowledge 
( Grimson and Bidaseca 2013).
The hegemonic model of globalism reiterates pre-exist-
ing institutional alliances between the private and the 
public sectors; however, it can also open up new networks, 
as it is the case with the global South agenda. According 
to Mignolo, the global South can ‘struggle between log-
ics of coloniality and domination, on the one hand, and 
independent thought and alternative freedoms, on the 
other’ (2011: 7). Scholars such as de Sousa Santos talk 
about ‘epistemologies of the South’ and the creation of 
South-to-South networks that do not subscribe to the 
‘divisions carried out by the global lines’ (De Sousa Santos 
2014). In Latin America over the last two decades, a cog-
nitive and epistemic shift has advocated to move away 
from modernist paradigms and to adopt epistemologi-
cal and ontological narratives in which rearticulating the 
natural environment’s role is paramount (Coletta and 
Raftopoulos 2016). The question of the historical as well as 
the theoretical legacy of modernist categories across disci-
plines has led to the notion of ‘decoloniality’ (Dussel 2000; 
Quijano 2000) and the search for new ways of understand-
ing and approaching the region’s post-colonial status.
Latin American scholars such as Quijano have 
 conceived of decoloniality as an epistemic and political 
project whereby epistemological decolonisation needs 
to be undertaken in order to break away from the link-
ages between modernity/rationality and coloniality. The 
 colonial matrix of power, expressed through the four 
interrelated domains of control of the economy, knowl-
edge and subjectivity, authority and racism, and gender 
and  sexuality, enabled Europe to impose its colonial 
dominance around the world. The imposition of this 
global hegemonic model, which involved a historical rei-
dentification through the allocation of new geo-cultural 
identities, continues to be present in postcolonial socie-
ties today. It is marked by the ongoing pronunciation of 
western  epistemology through the control of subjectivity 
and objectification (Quijano 2000; Escobar 2008). The 
politics of difference and sameness remains profoundly 
 sculptured by the myths of universality and cultural supe-
riority that were established during the colonial period 
and still dominate Latin America to date through the sub-
ordination of non-Eurocentric cultures and knowledges to 
modernist thought (Escobar 2008).
This pattern of domination and suppression is clearly 
visible in the rationalistic subject/object dichotomy that 
lies at the heart of modernity, which has ‘in the last centu-
ries determined the division between nature and society, 
a colonial distinction between modern and non-modern 
indigenous peoples, the myth of progress as a unidirec-
tional linear path, and a strong confidence in Cartesian 
science’ (Gudynas 2011: 447). The Cartesian distinction 
between a thinking subject and the object of the subject’s 
thought which was reproduced in the European mind’s 
objectification of the new world’s nature, presents ‘a deep 
ideological impediment to the genuine recognition of all 
“others”’ (Grear 2015: 85). The idea of the ‘other’, which 
‘denies the idea of the social totality’ (Quijano 2007: 173), 
was critically missing from this dichotomy. This made it 
possible ‘to omit every reference to any other “subject” 
outside the European context’, including the question of 
nature (ibid.). However, the systematic repression of the 
‘other’, often through violence, has been accompanied by 
the continual production of diverse knowledges by sub-
altern groups, ‘generated in the ceaseless process of liv-
ing at the epistemic borders of the modern colonial world 
system’ (Escobar 2008: 12). Subaltern knowledges shaped 
by the experience of coloniality and emerging through 
social movements and indigenous organisations, have the 
potential to become spaces for the articulations of alter-
native projects and facilitate the pluriversality of socion-
atural formations (ibid.).
The denial of otherness is vital to understanding the piv-
otal role nature has historically played, and continues to 
play, in the global model of capitalism. Mignolo (2011: 
10) suggests that ‘nature’ could easily be considered the 
fifth domain of the colonial matrix, instead of being 
considered as part of the economic domain. As Escobar 
argues, ‘it is the nature of coloniality to enact a coloni-
ality of nature’ (2008: 120). The Euro-modernist perspec-
tive of nature based on the Cartesian epistemological and 
ontological model, which sees it as separate from society, 
are increasingly being questioned under the category of 
decoloniality, while silenced histories, repressed subjectiv-
ities, subalternised knowledges and languages are being 
re-appropriated. For Mignolo (2007), decoloniality essen-
tially means to delink from the colonial matrix of power 
and logic of coloniality by engaging in other epistemolo-
gies and alternative principles of knowledge and under-
standing other than modernity. The concept of ‘nature’ 
has become incorporated into the struggle for control of 
the colonial matrix of power, while the delinking process 
has given rise to pluriversal concepts such as pachamama 
or Mother Earth, which do not distinguish between nature 
and culture and pose a challenge to Cartesian thought. 
Accepting pluriversal socio-natural formations like 
pachamama implies an acceptance that the human world 
is intrinsically connected to the non-human world.
In trying to rid culture of the assumption that it con-
sists of a ‘symbolic structure that continues to support the 
belief in the existence of […] a world constituted by a single 
world that’ (Escobar 2014: 17), Escobar defines it as ‘radi-
cal difference’ (2014: 17). While the former version implies 
the structures of modernity and, within it, the ‘invisibil-
ity of the Afro-indigenous and of sustainability’, the lat-
ter reveals hidden multiple ontological premises such as 
‘“civilisation”, “cosmovision”, “epistemic difference” and 
“communal logic”’ (ibid.). This project of questioning and 
redefinition of the symbolic in ontological terms results, 
on the one hand, in the political project of ‘problematis-
ing “national” identities’ and, on the other hand, in the 
existential project of ‘problematising life’ in the face of the 
current ecological crisis (ibid., 19). This clearly demands a 
redefinition of sovereignty through a ‘political ontology 
of territory’ (ibid.). Breaking with the single-world pro-
ject means affirming a multiplicity of world ontologies 
and interfering with the ‘neo-liberal globalising project of 
building a Single World’ through the dominant discourse 
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of modernity with its ‘dualist ontology’ (ibid., 76). In 
this sense, the global North and global South discourse 
risks reiterating the modernist dualism between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, between developed and underdeveloped, in a way 
that is potentially even more pervasive given its lack of 
geographical constraints and its ubiquitousness.
Escobar, on the other hand, envisages a new existen-
tial project of living well with dignity, which parallels a 
new political project based on territorial organisation and 
governance according to a relational ontology: ‘territory 
is both material and symbolic, biophysical and epistemic, 
but above anything else it is a process of socio-cultural 
apprehension of the nature and the ecosystems that each 
societal group implements from its own “cosmovision” 
or “ontology”’ (2014: 91). Such ontology does not fit the 
modernist epistemic frame which has been defined by 
anthropocentrism (Querejazu 2016). Furthermore, pluriv-
erality as an ontology calls into question the essentialist or 
constructivist divide around which nature epistemologies 
are usually organised (Escobar 2008). While the decoloni-
ality of knowledge opens up new possibilities for differ-
ent epistemic and political conceptions of nature, there 
are, as Mignolo notes, many ‘issues that emerge from 
the analytic of the coloniality of nature (that is, its con-
trol and management) and in decolonial thinking and 
doing on environmental issues’ (2011: 10). Furthermore, 
it is questionable how ecological challenges, such as cli-
mate change and natural resource management, can be 
addressed when, according to western thought, they can 
only be framed within the Cartesian epistemological and 
ontological model which is grounded in the idea that 
nature is an unlimited resource, devoid of any rights (de 
Sousa Santos 2014). As Escobar points out, nature episte-
mologies are key to how the current environmental crisis 
is viewed and addressed (2008: 120).
This politics of knowledge is what, according to Blaser, 
‘trouble[s] the troubled waters of a modernist ontology’ as 
it is the case in the Andean countries of Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia ‘through the political activation of earth-beings 
such as pachamama’ (2012: 51). Blaser uses the notion of 
heterogeneity in defining the unsettling of the categorisa-
tion of culture by ontology’s ‘hetegorenous assemblages’ 
of culture-natures, which defy the modernist notion of 
‘cultural difference’ by assuming a multiplicity of worlds 
rather than multiple views on a single world (2012: 
50–52). Similarly, for Walsh, post-modern forms such as 
multi-culturalism are nothing more than a tool for the 
nation-state’s dominant groups to maintain and extend 
their power through the state’s institutional practices 
(Walsh 2009). The ‘monocultural’ model of the nation-
state should be replaced, according to Walsh, by a ‘plurina-
tional’ state on the basis of which an ‘intercultural’ state 
can be constructed, whereby the interests and cultures 
of non-dominant groups have political agency (2009: 
68–69). In Latin America, Bolivia has been the first coun-
try to recongnise itself as a plurinational state: one of the 
elements on which this new national constitution is based 
is that of a plurality of nations ‘which seeks the articulation 
of the different nations’ administrations of justice in equal 
terms within the state’ (Walsh 2009: 73). The architecture 
of the new constitution of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, adopted in 2009, is based on three major axes: 
plurinationality, autonomy and the new productive eco-
nomic model (García Linera 2015). As Lalander explains, 
the plurinational character of Bolivia is related to ‘deco-
lonialisation and the historical-symbolic recognition of 
legal pluralism, indigenous autonomies in parallel to the 
traditional politico-territorial division of the state, as well 
as a broader reconfiguration of the political society based 
on indigenous participation’ (2017: 47). Furthermore, ‘[it] 
is precisely that of the plurality of nations, which pro-
motes the rights of different indigenous nations to articu-
late political demands and administer justice within the 
Bolivian nation’ (ibid.). It seems apparent that the issue of 
sovereignty is at stake both in the notion of ontology and 
in the project of plurinationality in a global governance 
context in which national and inter-national interests pre-
vail through state-capital alliances.
Contesting the Global environmental Agenda? 
The Case of Bolivia
In Bolivia, environmental governance has become closely 
entwined with debates related to natural resource extrac-
tion, nationalism, indigenous identity and sustainability. 
During his inaugural speech, Morales reaffirmed his pledge 
to take back control of Bolivia’s vast natural resources, 
nationalising oil and gas under Supreme Decree No. 28701 
that same year. Critical to the processes of change and the 
‘cultural democratic revolution’ proposed by Morales was 
the concept of decoloniality whereby state action would 
be orientated towards breaking free from the ‘Colonial 
matrix of power’ (Quijano 2000; Mignolo 2007), allowing 
Bolivia to ‘move beyond radicalised systems of servitude 
and structural inequalities to a new and more equitable 
society’ (Postero 2017: 12). Morales’ election brought with 
it widespread optimism that finally a Bolivian government 
would transcend modernist development paradigms and 
break imperialist dependency by offering radical alter-
natives to socio-economic development discourses and 
reconceptualising socio-natures beyond existing political 
and economic paradigms.
Environmental policy during the early years of Morales’ 
first administration was shaped around two Andean indig-
enous concepts: buen vivir and pachamama. Following the 
adoption of its new constitution, Bolivia redefined itself 
as a plurinational and communtarian state in a post-
colonial context and incorporated buen vivir [live well] 
principles into its national development plans an attempt 
to strengthen plural cultural identities (Gudynas 2011). 
Furthermore, it incorporated far-reaching indigenous 
political, cultural and developmental rights, including 
the right to free, prior and informed consultation but not 
consent (Powęska 2017). Critically, this has allowed the 
state to maintain its sovereignty over its natural resources 
and has paradoxically contributed to the subordination of 
ethnically defined rights in favour of class-based human 
rights, considered more urgent than conserving the envi-
ronment and protecting indigenous communities by the 
state (Lalander 2017), thus endangering the possibility of 
an intercultural state.
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The inclusion of strong environmental and intercultural 
components into the rhetoric of buen vivir runs contrary 
to modernist development ideas and marks a significant 
move away from traditional anthropocentric perspectives 
towards a more eco-holistic conception of life and society 
built upon the notion of ‘the communal’ (Mignolo 2009: 
2). A form of social organisation that existed prior to the 
European colonialisation of Latin America (ibid.), social 
movements in Bolivia mobilised around the discourse of 
‘the communal’ during the Water Wars of 2000 and later 
in the Gas Wars of 2003 (Fabricant 2013). The concept 
of buen vivir represents an alternative model of environ-
mental governance based on indigenous cosmologies. It 
calls into question the Cartesian distinction between sub-
jectivity and objectivity in that it advocates harmonious 
living between the human and non-human, the rights of 
nature with regard to existence, maintenance and regen-
eration of its life cycles, and important equilibriums such 
as quality of life. It also importantly focuses on biocentric 
concerns oriented towards protecting non-human organ-
isms and nature. Unlike anthropocentrism, which ‘pro-
motes the preservation of the environment as a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself’, biocentrism regards 
the environment’s well-being as a ‘moral imperative inde-
pendently of its impact on human flourishing’ (Rottman 
2014: 1). However, while the notion of the ‘ecologically 
noble native’ has been frequently used by both the MAS 
government and oppositional indigenous groups, indige-
nous people are not a homogenous group unified in their 
stance on extractivism. Although the environment may be 
a concern of indigenous peoples, identity-based concerns 
has at times outweighed ecological concerns within the 
extractive development dilemma (Lalander 2017).
The adoption of the Law of Mother Earth in 2010, later 
upgraded by the National Legislative Assembly as the 
Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development 
to Live Well, legally incorporated the principles of buen 
vivir into the Bolivian Constitution (Lalander 2017). The 
law set a global precedent by recognising the rights of all 
living things and giving the natural world equal status to 
human beings. The construction of an alternative envi-
ronmentalism to western dominant environmental dis-
courses has played an important role in MAS’s decolonial 
political project and has become a key aspect of Bolivian 
foreign policy within the arena of global environmental 
politics. This is hardly surprising given Bolivia’s increasing 
concerns over the impact of climate change as well as the 
engagement of local social movements and indigenous 
groups such as the Bolivian Platform for Climate Change 
(La Plataforma Boliviana Frente al Cambio Climático), 
which have influenced Morales’ radical position in inter-
national climate change negotiations (Fabricant 2013). 
On an international level, Morales has actively sought to 
politicise environmental issues through the global cli-
mate change politics by employing a ‘radical green’ dis-
course, which identifies the capitalist system as the main 
structural cause of climate change and promotes indig-
enous sustainable practices and traditions to frame its 
alternative environmental principles (Stevenson 2014). As 
Stevenson notes, Bolivia, as well as other member-states 
of the ALBA, ‘have taken advantage of the authority and 
privileges bestowed by the norm of sovereignty to par-
ticipate directly in multilateral consultations and negotia-
tions. Yet, they have simultaneously attempted to defy the 
limitations of sovereignty by invoking a constituency that 
transcends their own national jurisdictions’ (2014: 179). 
Claiming to represent a ‘culture of life’ rather than the 
Euro-modernist ‘culture of death’, Morales’ stance in the 
global climate change debate has been based not only on 
an ethical vision but also on climate justice.
During the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference, Morales, blaming the capitalist global model 
for climate change, argued that rich countries should pay 
climate change reparations to poorer countries who were 
suffering from the effects of climate change. He even pro-
posed the creation of an international climate court of 
justice through which countries could be prosecuted for 
crimes against the environment (Vidal 2009). Following 
his provocative speech, Morales successfully campaigned 
to have the United Nations declare the 22 April as 
International Mother Earth Day and to make access to 
water a universal human right, which was recognised by 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/292 
in July in 2010. That same year, Bolivia hosted the World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights 
of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, which resulted in the 
signing of People’s Agreement and the incorporation of 
buen vivir into international discourse. In October 2015, 
ahead of the Paris climate change talks (COP 21), Bolivia 
submitted its national climate action plan to the United 
Nations and offered ‘ten structural solutions to the cli-
mate crisis’. These include: the protection of the Rights of 
Mother Earth; eradicating the commodification of nature 
and carbon markets; decolonising natural resources and 
environmental colonial-biased views; and adopting alter-
native models to capitalism.
In September 2017, Morales used the General Assembly’s 
annual general debate at the United Nations to call for 
political will and solidarity to confront the vast chal-
lenges facing the planet. Top of the agenda was climate 
change and water. Emphasising that water is the life blood 
of Mother Earth and a universal common asset, Morales 
argued that water must be respected, shared and kept for 
future generations regardless of any distinction of political 
borders or nationalities. Drawing attention to Bolivia’s con-
stitution, Morales promoted the recognition of water as a 
human right and noted that Bolivia prohibited the exploi-
tation of water for profit or trade (United Nations 2017). 
The Bolivian president used the VIII Business Summit of 
the Americas in Peru in April 2018 as an opportunity to 
petition for a change in the region’s position within the 
productive chain from a mere supplier of raw materials. 
Morales argued that America, because of its geographi-
cal diversity, has great potential to develop ‘a healthy and 
clean production of food for the whole world; enough 
potential and raw materials to produce goods with high 
added value and capacity to produce without polluting’ 
(Resumenlatinoamericano 2018). However, Morales’ bold 
rhetoric on the international stage has fallen short on the 
national level despite the incorporation of the notion of 
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living in harmony with nature into the constitution and 
granting nature inalienable rights, and the government’s 
position has gradually shifted back to a developmental 
rhetoric.
Tensions between Bolivia’s decolonial project and the 
current extractive model of development have become 
increasingly evident and have brought to the forefront crit-
ical concerns over the environment and indigenous rights 
as economic growth has been prioritised over alternative 
environmentalism and sustainability. Following Bolivia’s 
rejection of REDD+ in 2010, which Morales argued further 
commodified nature and allowed the North to evade their 
climatic and environmental debt by transferring responsi-
bility to poor countries, Bolivia announced its own alter-
native to REDD+ at COP17. Bolivia’s proposal, ‘The Joint 
Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism for Holistic and 
Sustainable Forest Management’ (Mecanismo Conjunto de 
Mitigación y Adaptacion para el Manejo Integral y Sostenible 
de los Bosques de la Madre Tierra; MCMA), was built on the 
2010 World People’s Conference on Climate Change and 
Rights of Mother Earth. Yet, despite Morales’ speech that 
forests were not for sale, the pursuit and intensification of 
extractivism in Bolivia has left little doubt over his com-
mitment to economic growth. In a decisive policy shift, 
the government passed a law on hydrocarbons (Supreme 
Decree 2366) in June 2015, which led to the opening 
up of 22 protected ecological reserves to hydrocarbon 
exploration.
At the centre of this controversial hydrocarbon law 
is Morales’ project to build a 300-kilometre highway 
through the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and 
National Park (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro 
Secure, TIPNIS). Part of the Initiative for the Integration of 
Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), an initi-
ative by South American governments to construct a new 
infrastructure network – roads, waterways, ports, energy 
and communications interconnections – for the conti-
nent, the highway will link the cities of Cochabamba and 
Trinidad and also integrate the country’s Amazonian and 
Andean regions. Opponents have argued that the road 
will contribute to deforestation and ecological destruc-
tion, open up the park to extractivism and threaten local 
indigenous communities. The TIPNIS case ‘aptly exem-
plifies the contradictions between the transformative 
ideas of vivir bien and the newly arisen state enthusiasm 
on resource extraction’ (Ranta 2016: 434). Part of IIRSA 
project and Morales’ plan to convert Bolivia into South 
America’s leading energy powerhouse, the MAS govern-
ment is pushing ahead with the controversial bi-national 
Chepete/Bala hydroelectric dam projects along the Beni 
River, which flows through one of the most biodiverse 
regions of the world and includes the Pilón Largas and 
Madidi National Parks. Having been declared a national 
priority, the Chepete/Bala project has become the centre-
piece of an ambitious hydroelectric programme aimed at 
diversifying Bolivia’s economy.
The lifting of the ban on unconventional gas explora-
tion, known colloquially as fracking, in Bolivia has further 
cemented Morales’ fidelity to natural resource exploi-
tation. In a meeting held in April 2018 on ‘Inversiones 
Gas y Petróleo Tarija’ at the Los Parrales Hotel in the 
city of Tarija, Morales and his Minister of Hydrocarbons, 
Luis Alberto Sánchez, presided over the signing of an 
agreement between Cantabria Energy Company and 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). The 
agreement gave the green light to explore unconventional 
gas in the regions of Chaco, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and 
Tarija where the company Cancambria Energy calculates 
that there are resources for more than 100 trillion cubic 
feet. Bolivia’s state oil and gas company YPFB, which 
first announced in early 2013 that it would begin stud-
ies to identify shale gas deposits, detailed that between 
2018 and 2022 $3.500 million would be allocated for 
hydrocarbon activities by the oil companies. Laying bare 
unconventional gas exploration and exploitation plans for 
in the country, the meeting revealed that Shell had allo-
cated $1.87 billion to the drilling of the Jaguar X-6 well 
located in the Huacareta block while Repsol would be 
investing $490 million, bringing the total investments for 
the department of Tarija to $2.477 million in the coming 
years. Furthermore, drilling is scheduled to begin in May 
in 2019 and production in 2022. The announcement has 
reignited concerns over the environmental impact of the 
government’s plans to expand its energy sector and the 
contradictions between the Law for the Rights of Mother 
Earth and Bolivia’s current development agenda. Morales 
himself sought to answer this question during the meet-
ing by arguing that ‘of course, it is our obligation to take 
care of the environment, to Mother Earth and now with 
technology there are so many ways of taking care of the 
environment’ (Mamani 2018).
Conclusion
An analysis of the limitations of the post-developmen-
talist discourse in Bolivia has demonstrated that new 
frameworks are necessary to rearticulate sovereignty 
for the future of global governance. By looking at the 
divergence between the international discourse and the 
intrastate practice during the Morales administration, it 
has been shown that there is a failure in accounting for 
other types of sovereignty other than the nation-state 
principles of territorial boundaries and interstate recog-
nition. Morales’ current narrative, which brings together 
a new promise of development and social justice for the 
 Bolivian nation, reiterates one of the staple principles of 
the neo-liberal Anthropocene: the reliance on technologi-
cal  advancement. However, ‘as human powers increase, 
each individual puts more pressure on the natural world. 
 Technology, then, brings efficiency, but it brings  neither 
restraint nor purpose’ (Purdy 2015: 260). On the other 
hand,  technology also holds a high symbolic capital 
in modernist paradigms; Allenby and Sarewitz (2011) 
describe the current socio-ecological scenario as a system 
in which the level of complexity caused by the conse-
quences of human technology is too high to be analysed 
and predicted with any accuracy. Since renewable energy 
continues to raise issues of land use and land rights, a 
reliance on technology is not enough. For Mignolo, ‘the 
current modern/colonial and mononational state [can-
not] offer a solution for a pluri-national state’ as long as 
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‘Indigenous and peasant leaders and communities [are 
not allowed] to intervene in de-c olonising the current 
mono-cultural state’ (Mignolo 2009).
The Latin American critiques of hegemonic modernity, 
starting from the notions of hybridity and heterogeneity 
and resulting more recently in the ideas of plurality and 
relationality, can be instrumental in this urgent reap-
praisal of the modern political subject. According to 
Hardt, it is necessary to construct ‘a subject already plural, 
and a subject defined not by property, not even by imma-
terial properties. […] [T]he many can not only cohere, but 
also act together — […] you don’t need to speak from a 
single voice, don’t need to take dictation from some cen-
tral authority, in order to act coherently politically’ (Fitch 
2018). A pluralistic idea of the nation seems to be implied 
in these observations; indeed, falling back onto the model 
of national sovereignty in Bolivia has proved to continue 
to be instrumental to a kind of global governance that 
benefits the national elites on which international capital 
relies. As it has been argued, ‘[d]evelopment projects have 
tended to de-structure and damage indigenous organisa-
tions’ (Dinerstein 2015: 152). The current neoliberal frame-
work of global governance, however, potentially facilitates 
transnational alliances between grassroots and indig-
enous groups and organisations. Executive Director of the 
Indigenous Environmental Network, Tom Goldtooth, delin-
eates the interconnectedness that international offset pro-
grammes create among indigenous communities across 
the global South and the global North: ‘[programmes such 
as REDD] [permit] the refineries to […] put a cap, and […] all 
the offsets that are being done are being done down in the 
Amazon’ (Democracy Now 2017). Transnational alliances 
among groups and networks across the global South and 
the global North, such as the Climate Justice Alliance, are 
emerging to represent the rights of intrastate communi-
ties whose claims to plural sovereignty are absorbed into 
national sovereignty. An analysis of the current failures of 
Latin American decolonial politics has shown that claims 
to sovereignty are not only articulated in legal and territo-
rial terms but also relational and epistemic terms.
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